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Remote MCP Deployment

Remote MCP Deployment

This guide explains whether NotebookLM MCP can be used as a remote connector from Claude web, Claude mobile, or another networked MCP client.

Short Answer

The server supports Streamable HTTP, so remote operation is technically possible. However, this project is designed and supported primarily for local, single-user use. It is not currently a secure, turnkey remote MCP service.

A production remote deployment must solve two independent authentication problems:

MCP client authentication — protecting the public MCP endpoint so only authorized clients can call it.
NotebookLM authentication — maintaining the Google browser session used by the server to access NotebookLM.

The project currently handles the second problem for local installations with a persistent browser profile. It does not provide the OAuth layer, HTTPS termination, or per-user isolation required for a public remote connector.

Current Capabilities

Requirement	Current status
Streamable HTTP transport	Supported
Stateless HTTP sessions	Supported and enabled by default
Configurable host, port, and MCP path	Supported
Public HTTPS endpoint	Not provided
Authentication protecting the MCP endpoint	Not implemented
Automatic Google session recovery	Supported when the host has a usable persistent browser profile
Fully headless recovery after Google requires sign-in	Not supported
Separate NotebookLM account per remote user	Not supported
Upload files from a browser or phone	Not supported
Return downloaded files to a browser or phone	Not supported

Why Claude Web and Mobile Are Different

Claude custom connectors connect to remote MCP servers from Anthropic's cloud infrastructure, not from the user's phone or computer. This also applies when the connector is used from Claude Desktop.

Therefore:

A connector cannot use localhost or a private endpoint that only your computer can reach.
The MCP server must be reachable from the public internet or from allowed Anthropic IP ranges.
The endpoint should use HTTPS.
If the endpoint requires authentication, it should implement an OAuth-compatible flow supported by Claude custom connectors.

See Anthropic's custom connector guide for current client and network requirements.

Security Warning

NotebookLM MCP has no built-in authentication for its HTTP endpoint.

By default, the server only binds to loopback addresses. It refuses external binding unless NOTEBOOKLM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_BIND=1 is set. That override only disables the safety check—it does not add authentication, authorization, or encryption.

Never expose the server directly to the public internet:

# Unsafe by itself: no authentication and no TLS
NOTEBOOKLM_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_BIND=1 \
notebooklm-mcp --transport http --host 0.0.0.0

Anyone who can reach an unprotected endpoint can operate the active NotebookLM account. Depending on the enabled tools, that may include reading notebooks, adding or deleting content, creating artifacts, changing sharing settings, and downloading data.

Use a trusted HTTPS gateway that authenticates every request before forwarding traffic to a loopback-only MCP server. A simple public tunnel without access control is not sufficient.

The NotebookLM Authentication Challenge

NotebookLM does not provide an official public API for this project. The CLI and MCP server authenticate with Google browser cookies extracted by nlm login.

The reliable local flow is:

nlm login creates a dedicated persistent browser profile.
The user signs in to Google interactively.
The CLI stores cookies and the browser profile on the same machine.
The MCP server refreshes short-lived NotebookLM tokens automatically.
If cookies stop working, the saved browser profile can often obtain fresh cookies without another manual sign-in.

This works best when the browser profile and MCP server remain on the same machine and network.

What cannot be guaranteed

Google can require interactive sign-in again at any time.
A machine with no usable browser profile cannot recover independently when the Google session expires.
Cookies copied from another computer may expire quickly or be rejected.
Cloud and VPS deployments may experience shorter session lifetimes than a normal local installation.
Setting NOTEBOOKLM_COOKIES manually creates a static credential. When it expires, nlm login cannot replace it while that environment variable continues to override the profile on disk.

For authentication details, see the Authentication Guide.

Single-Account Architecture

The MCP server uses one process-wide NotebookLM client and whichever profile is currently selected as the default:

nlm login switch <profile>

Every caller of that server operates the same Google account and sees the same NotebookLM notebooks. The current server does not map a remote Claude user to a separate Google account.

This has important consequences:

It may be reasonable for one person connecting from several devices.
It is not a safe organization-wide connector for unrelated users.
An OAuth gateway can control who reaches the MCP endpoint, but it does not create per-user NotebookLM isolation.
Account switching affects the whole server, not one remote session.

Remote File Limitations

File paths always refer to the filesystem where notebooklm-mcp is running.

For example:

source_add(
    notebook_id="...",
    source_type="file",
    file_path="/path/on/server/document.pdf",
)

The server cannot read a path from the user's phone or browser. Similarly:

download_artifact(
    notebook_id="...",
    artifact_type="audio",
    output_path="/path/on/server/audio.m4a",
)

The artifact is saved on the server host. The current MCP does not provide a browser upload mechanism or a secure download URL for returning that file to a remote client.

Remote deployments are therefore better suited to operations involving:

Notebook listing and queries
URL and text sources
Google Drive sources
Research
Studio creation and status checks
Notebook and source metadata

Local file upload and artifact download require a separate, securely designed file-transfer layer.

Deployment Options

Option 1: Claude Code Remote Control

This is the recommended option when the goal is to use NotebookLM from a phone or another browser without operating a public MCP service.

The NotebookLM MCP and Claude Code continue running locally on your computer. Claude Code Remote Control lets you continue that local session from Claude web or the Claude mobile app.

Advantages:

The MCP server remains local and does not need a public inbound port.
The managed browser profile remains on the same machine.
Local file paths continue to work.
No custom OAuth gateway is required.

See Claude Code Remote Control.

Option 2: Advanced Single-User Remote Connector

This architecture is technically viable but is not a supported turnkey deployment:

Claude web/mobile
        |
        | HTTPS + OAuth
        v
Authenticated gateway
        |
        | private loopback connection
        v
NotebookLM MCP (Streamable HTTP)
        |
        | Google browser session
        v
NotebookLM

Recommended properties:

Run on an always-on machine controlled by the same user.
Keep a supported Chromium-family browser and the managed profile on that host.
Run the MCP server on 127.0.0.1, not directly on a public interface.
Put an OAuth-capable HTTPS gateway in front of the server.
Restrict the connector to the owner of the active NotebookLM account.
Monitor nlm login --check and be prepared for occasional interactive login.
Treat the host as security-sensitive because it stores Google session data.

The private MCP process can be started with:

notebooklm-mcp \
  --transport http \
  --host 127.0.0.1 \
  --port 8000 \
  --path /mcp

The public gateway—not the MCP process itself—must provide HTTPS and caller authentication.

Option 3: Cloud VPS or Container

This is not recommended as a persistent deployment unless the operator accepts manual authentication maintenance.

Common problems include:

No interactive browser for the initial or renewed Google login
Ephemeral storage deleting the managed browser profile
Copied or environment-variable cookies expiring without automatic recovery
Datacenter network addresses receiving different Google session treatment
Public endpoint security and OAuth still needing a separate solution
Server-local file paths being inaccessible to end users

Running the software in a container does not solve these authentication or security problems by itself.

Local HTTP Testing

The HTTP transport can be tested safely on the same machine:

# Authenticate first
nlm login

# Start a loopback-only Streamable HTTP server
notebooklm-mcp \
  --transport http \
  --host 127.0.0.1 \
  --port 8000 \
  --path /mcp

The MCP endpoint is:

http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp

The health endpoint is:

http://127.0.0.1:8000/health

This confirms transport compatibility. It does not create a Claude web/mobile connector because Anthropic's cloud cannot reach your loopback address.

Support Status

Supported:

Local stdio MCP usage
Local loopback HTTP transport
Authentication through nlm login
Automatic refresh using a persistent local browser profile

Advanced and unsupported:

Public remote connectors
Cloud/VPS/container hosting
Reverse proxies and tunnels
OAuth gateway configuration
Multi-user deployments
Remote file-transfer bridges

Remote deployment reports are useful for understanding demand, but the project cannot guarantee long-lived Google sessions, cloud compatibility, or secure multi-user operation.

These recurring questions informed this guide: